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Abstract In this paper we propose right-angled Artin groups as a platform for secret sharing
schemes based on the efficiency (linear time) of the word problem. Inspired by previous
work of Grigoriev-Shpilrain in the context of graphs, we define two new problems: Subgroup
Isomorphism Problem and Group Homomorphism Problem. Based on them, we also propose
two new authentication schemes. For right-angled Artin groups, the Group Homomorphism
and Graph Homomorphism problems are equivalent, and the later is known to be NP-complete.
In the case of the Subgroup Isomorphism problem, we bring some results due to Bridson who
shows there are right-angled Artin groups in which this problem is unsolvable.
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1

Introduction

Using algorithmic group theoretic problems in cryptography has been an active area of research
since 1999 (see [1] for a thorough account). The complexity of different algorithmic problems
(Conjugacy Problems, Membership Problems, etc.) have made available a lot of families of
groups as platform groups for cryptographic protocols, as for example:
• braid groups, using the Conjugacy Search Problem [2],
• polycyclic groups, using the Conjugacy Search Problem [3, 4],
• Thompson groups, based on the Decomposition Search Problem [5],
∗
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• hyperbolic groups, using properties of subgroup distortion and the Geodesic Length Problem
[6],
• free metabelian groups, based on the Subgroup Membership Search Problem [7], and in the
Endomorphism Search Problem [8],
• free nilpotent p-groups, for a semidirect product public key [9],
• linear groups [10],
• Grigorchuk groups, for cryptographic protocols [11],
• groups of matrices, for a Homomorphic Encryption scheme [12].
Note that some are infinite and some are finite, but they are all non-commutative.
As mentioned above, we propose here right-angled Artin groups for two secret sharing schemes,
as well as two authentication schemes. For the first, we follow the approach of Habeeb-KahrobaeiShpilrain [8] and Shamir [13], while the second is a modification of two protocols developed by
Grigoriev-Shpilrain [14] in the context of graphs, that we adapt to the language of right-angled
Artin groups by using the graph which is always associated to these groups. Then, we take
advantage of the fact that many graph-theoretic problems that are proved to be NP-complete
can be translated to a group-theoretic setting in the right-angled Artin groups, and also of some
unsolvability results which are proper from this context. Besides that it is always of interest to
introduce new applications of Group Theory in cryptography, we also note that working with
group presentation is easier and sometimes more practical than working with graphs. We note
that Shpilrain-Zapata have proposed a key exchange based on Artin groups but this class is much
bigger than right-angled Artin groups [7].
This article is structured as follows. In Sec. 2 we review the main features of right-angled
Artin groups that will be useful for our purposes. Sec. 3 is devoted to the description of the
sharing schemes, while the authentication schemes are treated in Sec. 4. Finally, in Sec. 5 we deal
with study of the security of the proposed protocols.

2

Right Angled Artin Groups

First we will introduce the main facts concerning right-angled Artin groups, a class probably
introduced first in [15] by Hauschild and Rautenberg (which called them semifree groups) in the
seventies. Good surveys about the topic can be found in [16] and [17], while a good general
introduction for the theory presentations of groups is [18].
Definition 1 (Right-angled Artin groups). Let Γ denote a finite simplicial graph. We will write
V = V (Γ) for the finite set of vertices and E(Γ) ⊂ V × V for the set of edges, viewed as unordered
pairs of vertices. The requirement that Γ be simplicial simply means that the diagonal of V × V
is excluded from the set of edges. The right-angled Artin group on Γ is the group
A(Γ) = hV |[vi , vj ] = 1 whenever (vi , vj ) ∈ Ei.

(1)

In other words, A(Γ) is generated by the vertices of Γ, and the only relations are given by
commutation of adjacent vertices.
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Observe that right-angled Artin groups, that are associated to a finite simplicial graph (the
Artin graph), are always finitely presented. It is clear from the definition that there is a bijective
correspondence between isomorphism types of right-angled Artin groups and isomorphism types
of finite simplicial graphs, in the sense that two right-angled Artin groups A(Γ) and A(Λ) are
isomorphic if and only if Γ = Λ. Moreover, a map f : A1 → A2 of right-angled Artin groups
is a homomorphism if and only if it induces a graph homomorphism between the corresponding
graphs.
We will be specially interested in the subgroups generated by subsets of the set S of generators.
If T ⊂ S is such a subgroup of a right-angled Artin groups A, it is usually denoted by AT and
called a special subgroup of A. Note that every special subgroup of A gives rise to a subgraph of
ΓA , but the converse is not true. For example, if we consider the graph with vertices {v0 , v1 } and
edge [v0 , v1 ], which corresponds to the free abelian group in two generators, the 0-dimensional
subgraph defined by the two vertices produces the free group in two generators, which is not a
subgroup of Z2 . It is easy to see that a subgraph Γ0 of an Artin graph Γ defines a special subgroup
of the corresponding right-angled Artin groups if and only if Γ0 is a full subgraph of Γ.
Definition 2. A subgraph Γ0 of a graph Γ is full if for every pair of vertices {v, w} in Γ0 such
that [v, w] is an edge in Γ, [v, w] is an edge in Γ0 .
The full subgraphs are also called spanning or induced. This condition is important in order
to use these subgroups as a platform for authentication.

3

Secret sharing threshold schemes

Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain have proposed a cryptosystem based on efficiency of the word problem [8], and we intend to use it with right-angled Artin groups. Let us describe the two schemes.
In the first protocol, which is an (n, n)-threshold scheme, the dealer distributes a k-column
C = [c1 , c2 , . . . , ck ]> consisting of bits (0’s and 1’s), among n participants in such a way that
the column can be reconstructed only when all participants combine their information. A set of
generators X = {x1 , . . . , xm } is public. Then:
1. The dealer uses a secure channel to assign to each participant Pj a set of commutators Rj
of the generators in X ± . Recall that each right-angled Artin group Gj = hx1 , . . . , xm |Rj i
has efficiently solvable word problem (see Sec. 5.1 below).
P
2. The secret bit column C is split by the dealer in a mod 2 sum nj=1 Cj on n bit columns,
which are the secret shares to be distributed to the n participants. The i-th entry of Cj will
be denoted by cij .
3. Words w1j , . . . , wkj in the generators of X are openly distributed by the dealer to the
participant Pj , for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The words are selected in such a way that wij 6= 1 if
cij = 0 and wij = 1 if cij = 1.
4. Each participant Pj check, for each i, if the word wij in the right-angled Artin group Gj is
trivial or not. Then, each participant can make the column Cj = [c1j , c2j , . . . , ckj ]> , whose
entries are 0’s and 1’s.
10
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Pn

j=1 Cj ,

again with the

The second protocol is a (t, n)-threshold scheme, and a modification of the previous one that
takes into account some ideas from [13], and allows a subset of size t of the total number of
participants n to reconstruct all the information. Now the secret is an element x ∈ Zp , and the
dealer chooses a polynomial f of degree t−1 such that f (0) = x. In addition the dealer determines
integers yi = f (i) mod p that are distributed to participants Pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n (we assume that all
integers x and yi can be written as k-bit columns). A set of group generators {x1 , . . . , xm } is
public.
1. A set of commutators Rj of the generators in X is secretly distributed to the participants
by the dealer. The group Gj = hx1 , . . . , xm |Rj i is a right-angled Artin group, and hence it
has an efficiently solvable word problem.
2. Now k-columns bj = [b1j , b2j , . . . , bkj ]> , with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are openly distributed by the dealer
to each participant, being their entries words in the generators. The words bij are chosen in
such a way that, after replacing them by bits (the bit ‘1’ if bij is trivial in the right-angled
Artin group Gj and ‘0’ otherwise), the resulting column represents the integer yi .
3. Now for each word bij , the participant Pj checks if this word is trivial or not in the rightangled group Gj , and in this way he/she obtains a binary representation of yj .
4. Finally, every participant has a point yi = f (i) of the original polynomial, and then every
set of t participants is able now to obtain f by polynomial interpolation, and also the secret
number x = f (0).
Note that every subset of t participants can recover the secret x by constructing the polynomial
f via interpolation, and this scheme can be arranged in such a way that participants do not have
to reveal their individual shares yi to each other if they do not want to. More details of these
protocols can be found in [8].

4 Authentication Schemes Based on the Group Homomorphism
and the Subgroup Isomorphism problems
Grigoriev and Shpilrain have proposed in [14] some authentication protocols using graph homomorphisms problem and subgraph isomorphism problem. In the sequel, we introduce two different
protocols, which are based on the group homomorphism and the subgroup isomorphism problems,
and that we introduce using right-angled Artin groups as a platform. They are inspired by the
work of these authors in the sense that they are originally (but not necessarily) addressed to be
used with group graphs as a platform. In this sense, and as we will see below, we would make
profit of unsolvability results for groups and also for graphs. We remark that we have developed
no analogy of the protocol based in the classical Graph Isomorphism problem, as it has recently
been shown by Babai [19] that its complexity is quasi-polynomial.
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An Authentication scheme using Group Homomorphism problem

Consider two finitely presented groups G1 = hS1 |R1 i and G2 = hS2 |R2 i, being Si generators
and Ri relations, i = 1, 2. The Group Homomorphism problem asks if there is a homomorphism
G1 → G2 that takes generators in S1 to generators in S2 .
The authentication protocol is the following:
1. Alice’s public key consists of two finitely presented groups G1 = hS1 |R1 i and G2 = hS2 |R2 i.
Alice’s long term private key is a homomorphism α sending generators in S1 to generators
in S2 .
2. Alice selects another finitely presented group G = hS|Ri, and a homomorphism β : G → G1
which sends generators in S to generators in S1 . Then she sends G = hS|Ri to Bob, and
keeps the homomorphism β to herself.
3. Bob chooses a random bit and sends c to Alice:
• When c = 0, Alice sends the homomorphism β to Bob, and Bob should check if
β(G) = G1 , and if β is a homomorphism that takes generators in S to generators
in S1 .
• When c = 1, Alice sends the composite αβ to Bob, and Bob checks whether αβ(G) =
G2 , and if the composite is a homomorphism that takes generators in S to generators
in S2 .

4.2 An Authentication Scheme Based on the Subgroup Isomorphism problem
The authentication protocol we propose is as follows:
1. Alice’s public key consists of two isomorphic subgroups of a group Γ, G1 and G2 . Alice’s
long-term private key is an isomorphism α : G1 → G2 .
2. To begin authentication, Alice selects a group G together with the isomorphism β : G → G1
and sends the group G (the commitment) to Bob, while keeping β to herself.
3. Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
• If c = 0, then Alice sends the isomorphism β to Bob, and Bob checks whether β(G) = G1
and whether β is an isomorphism.
• If c = 1, then Alice sends the composition αβ = β(α) to Bob, and Bob checks whether
αβ(G) = G2 and whether αβ is an isomorphism.

5

Complexity and security

In this section we state the complexity results that make right-angled Artin groups a good platform
for the previous protocols.
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Word problem

To introduce a family of groups as a platform for the secret sharing scheme described [8] it is
necessary that its word problem can be solved efficiently. In the mentioned paper, for example,
the authors apply their cryptosystem for small cancellation groups. In the case of right-angled
Artin groups, the easiness of the word problem was first proved in a paper by Liu-Wrathall-Zeger
[20] which in a more general framework of free partially commutative monoids, describes an
algorithm which is effective in linear polynomial time. More recently, Crisp-Goddelle-Wiest [21]
have extended this result (with different methods) to some families of subgroups of right-angled
Artin groups, as for example braid groups.

5.2 Security assumption, complexity analysis and platform groups (rightangled Artin groups)
The security of our proposed authentication schemes relies, for the first scheme, on the difficulty
of the Graph Homomorphism problem, and for the second, on some Bridson unsolvability results.
Let us analyze in detail both situations.
5.2.1

Group Homomorphism Problem and proposed authentication scheme:

We observe that the problem is equivalent to the Graph Homomorphism problem for graphs, as
there is a bijection between right-angled Artin groups and finite simplicial graphs (see Sec. 2),
and recall that this problem has been shown to remain NP-complete even when the graph in the
right is a triangle [22]. Hence, it would be enough here to select two right-angled Artin groups
Γ1 and Γ2 such that Γ2 contains a free abelian group in three generators.
5.2.2

Subgroup Isomorphism Problem and proposed authentication scheme:

Martin Bridson has proved [23] that there exist families of right-angled Artin groups for which this
problem is unsolvable, even for finitely presented subgroups. Let us briefly recall the construction.
He starts with a free group in a finite number of generators, and performs over it Rips construction
[24] in the specific version of Haglund and Wise ([25], Sec. 10). In this way we obtain an explicit
presentation of a hyperbolic group Γ that possess a finite index subgroup Γ0 < Γ, which is the
fundamental group of a special cube complex. This complex is subject to certain restrictions
([25], Theorem 1.1), that give rise to the existence of a local isometry with a standard cube
complex, and in particular imply the existence of an embedding of Γ0 in the fundamental group
of the latter, which is a right-angled Artin group and we call A. The group Γ0 also projects onto
a non-abelian free group, and the kernel is infinite and finitely-generated. Then, by a previous
result of Bridson-Miller [26], the subgroup Isomorphism problem is unsolvable for every product
Γ0 × Γ0 × F , being F any non-abelian free group. As Γ0 < A, the problem is also unsolvable for
A × A × F , and this is a right-angled Artin group itself, as it is the product of right-angled Artin
groups.
In general, to compare the Subgroup Isomorphism problem and the Subgraph Isomorphism
problem we need that the generators and relators on the groups can be represented as a graph.
But this is only a necessary condition. For example, in right-angled Artin groups there are plenty
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of subgroups that cannot be represented by a subgraph of the Artin graph (for example, the
cyclic group generated by the product of two generators). An authentication scheme based in
this problem for right-angled Artin groups only should make use of the special subgroups, and
should take into account the fact that not every subgraph of the Artin graph represents a special
subgroup. This approach is closer to the problem of subgroup isomorphism for full subgraphs
of a finite graph, usually called the induced Subgraph Isomorphism problem, which is known to
be NP-complete in general (see [27] for a reference). For the classical Subgroup Isomorphism
problem, it is more straightforward to appeal to Bridson unsolvability results described above.
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